American journalist Jeffrey Tayler reported on imminent fall of the Putin's regime in an article in Business Week entitled "Vladimir Putin, Falling Czar".
The article is subtitled "Defying protests, Putin is poised to return as Russia's President. But his days are numbered". Mr. Tayler says in particular:
"Russia is divided between those who are willing to stand up to Putin's regime, and those who, out of fear or for personal gain or even just habit, favor its continuation.
Dread of chaos and repression, Russians often say, is in their genes, and overcoming such a genetic patrimony takes guts, plus the certainty that what is to come will be better than the present. Trepidation and inveterate pessimism are motivating some people to stand by the devil they know.
The surprising strength and resiliency of the opposition movement, however, raise doubts about whether he can hold on to power that long. The most important question for Russia and the world is less what the next Putin term will look like than what direction the country will take when he is gone.
Putin's most valuable asset right now may be the long memory of the Russian people. Russia's last major political stand-off-in October 1993, between former President Boris Yeltsin and the reactionary, Soviet-dominated legislature-ended in bloodshed.
Later that year the government adopted an authoritarian constitution that paved the way for Putin's centralized rule. Few democracy activists are inclined toward violence today, and most suspect that Putin would be even harsher than his predecessor in dealing with an open rebellion.
Russia's business community has largely learned to work within the system (or else!) and counsels caution
As the years passed, graft and corruption increased in proportion to Putin's centralization of power. Among other misdeeds, Putin and his cronies are alleged to have channeled billions of dollars to offshore bank accounts. Ordinary Russians are tired of lawlessness and proizvol, the arbitrary abuse meted out by a venal elite and its lackeys.
They are sick of suffering demands for bribes from policemen and bureaucrats, doctors and teachers. They know about the massive hydrocarbon revenues flowing into state coffers as they watch hospitals deteriorate, roads decay, social services falter, and prices rise.
Many Russians now also travel abroad and speak English; they understand that the corruption pervading all areas of their lives is a relative anomaly. Putin, they presume, controls everything and thus must assume the blame for all these outrages.
The parliamentary elections, held last Dec. 4, were the last straw.
Despite the palpable discontent on Russia's streets, there is no obvious alternative to Putin. His most formidable official challenger in next month's election-official in the sense that he is a registered candidate-is Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov, 68, who polls a paltry 8 percent.
That leaves the gang of activists who for years have led sparsely attended demonstrations and suffered routine detention as a result.
Oldest among them is former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, who is 48 and has promoted democracy's cause since 2004, when he founded the Free Choice 2008 Committee.
But Kasparov's Jewish and Armenian descent makes him an unlikely President, given endemic anti-Semitism and rising Russian chauvinism.
Sergei Udaltsov, 34, leader of Vanguard of Red Youth and coordinator of the radical Left Front, repeatedly decries Russia's "monstrous social inequality" and has predicted a "people's uprising" if the government continues to ignore the opposition.
His social agenda addresses the widespread income inequalities that have characterized Putin's Russia, but his hard-line leftism (he led the Stalinist Bloc in a failed bid for parliamentary seats in 1999) does not sit well with those who find the Soviet past frightful and no guide for the future.
Then there's Alexei Navalny, 35, the blogger who has emerged as the opposition's most prominent figure. A staunch Russian nationalist and lawyer by trade, he has tried to reassure investors and bankers in Moscow that they need not fear the demonstrators; in fact, during his legal career he lobbied for shareholder rights, which are sorely lacking in Russia. For the moment, neither he nor the other oppositionists are sufficiently well-known to command a national following.
There is no Russian Mandela, no Muscovite Havel waiting in the wings to unify the country and chart a path to a demonstrably brighter future.
In the short run, that bolsters Putin. But divisions among the opposition will work to its long-term benefit, by slowing down the movement, giving its young leaders time to mature, and letting Russians see just who they are and what they have to offer.
What, then, awaits Russia? Though inevitable, Putin's victory will be pyrrhic. The prospect of six more years (at least) of Putin's rule, if ushered in by fraud, may swing public opinion decisively against Putin and his clan, converting the protest movement into something more tumultuous and threatening.
The unofficial opposition already considers these elections fraudulent, since legitimate candidates were prevented from taking part. Even if citizens in the hinterland remain on Putin's side, the populations in the big cities will be the ones who end up determining the confrontation's outcome.
Would Putin, once elected, point his guns at the demonstrators, should they increase in number? He has not been hesitant about employing force in other settings: His rise to power owed in part to his prosecution of a brutal war against separatists in Chechnya.
But Russia today is a different country, and violence would only catalyze the movement he seeks to marginalize. It would also jeopardize the regime's access to the halls of Davos, the resorts of Europe, and overseas banks.
If Putin resorts to repression, his own elite, eager to retain its privileges in the West, may well oust him.
A graceful exit, though, is equally unimaginable. In Putin's mind he must remain in office at all costs or face a future of trials for corruption or worse. He confronts an insoluble conundrum, in which his job security depends on the Russian people's returning to apathy and submissiveness.
Barring a heavy-handed government crackdown that could push the country toward implosion, Russia appears to be headed for a protracted struggle between the government and the opposition, which, divided as it may be, will agitate and use the power of the street to force change.
The disparate opposition groups will continue to stage demonstrations and marches-consolidating support and developing a common agenda. It could take months, possibly years, for the movement to succeed. As the two sides joust for advantage, businesspeople and investors, as well as average folk, will have time to adjust to the prospect of a post-Putin era.
If the opposition succeeds in tilting public opinion against the government, Putin may find himself left with few options. He would surely demand guarantees of immunity for himself and his elite as a condition of his voluntary exit, as, in effect, Yeltsin did when he handed power to Putin 12 years ago (after the death of Boris Yeltsin, these guarantees are null and void, Yeltsinists may be easily imprisoned - KC).
The opposition's plans for a one-year transition would allow candidates for the presidency to propose detailed platforms and garner support based on something other than anti-Putin ire.
Though it would suffer an immediate shock from the loss of contacts it has built up with Putin's government, the business community would, in the end, benefit from a more open and competitive political environment.
The coming ides of March (and beyond) may prove turbulent, but they augur well for Russia and those who believe in its promise (this country has no prospect sat all, its death is inevitable under any political system, all future prospects lie on the path towards disintegration of Russia - KC).
The key demand of protesters ringing from loudspeakers throughout the frigid air on Bolotnaya Square was for honest elections-an essential attribute for the rule of law. Russia has never tried that (and will never do it, since huge Russia is not organically suitable for democracy; democracy could be installed in small post-Russia's countries - KC). It's about time it did".
Department of Monitoring
Kavkaz Center
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