The odds are that President George Bush will announce
a "surge" of up to 20,000 additional US
troops in Iraq.
But why? Will this deliver a "win"? The answers: a combination of
misunderstanding and desperation; and, probably not.
The recent congressional elections - which turned over
control of both houses to the Democrats - were largely a referendum on
President Bush, and much of the vote reflected public dissatisfaction with the
war in Iraq.
Most Americans see the US
effort as failing, and believe that some different course of action must be
taken. Most favour withdrawing forces soon, if not immediately. The report of
the Iraq Study Group is widely seen as a formal confirmation of US failure in Iraq.
The country's action there has been the very
centrepiece of the Bush presidency. With two years left in office, he would, of
course, try to salvage the situation. Many Americans remember the 1975
evacuation of the US embassy
in Saigon, with desperate, loyal Vietnamese
friends clinging to the skids of the American helicopters. No one wants that
kind of an ending in Iraq.
And our friends and allies in the region are also hoping for the US to pull some kind "rabbit from the
hat", even if it seems improbable, for a US failure would have grave
consequences in the region. Iran,
especially, is the beneficiary of a failure, and al-Qa'ida will also try to
claim credit.
From the administration's perspective, a troop surge
of modest size is virtually the only remaining action inside Iraq that will
be a visible signal of determination. More economic assistance is likely to be
touted, but in the absence of a change in the pattern of violence,
infrastructure enhancement simply isn't practical. And if the President
announces new Iraqi political efforts - well, that's been tried before, and is
there any hope that this time will be different?
As for the US
troops, yes, several additional brigades in Baghdad would enable more roadblocks,
patrols, neighbourhood clearing operations and overnight presence. But how
significant will this be? We've never had enough troops in Iraq - in
Kosovo, we had 40,000 troops for a population of two million. For Iraq that ratio would call for at least 500,000
troops, so adding 20,000 seems too little, too late, even, for Baghdad. Further, in a "clear and
hold" strategy, US troops have been shown to lack the language skills,
cultural awareness and political legitimacy to ensure that areas can be
"held", or even that they are fully "cleared". The key
would be more Iraqi troops, but they aren't available in the numbers required
for a city of more than five million with no reliable police - nor have the
Iraqi troops been reliable enough for the gritty work of dealing with militias
and sectarian loyalties. Achieving enhanced protection for the population is
going to be problematic at best. Even then, militia fighters in Baghdad could redeploy to
other areas and continue the fight there.
What the surge would do, however, is put more American
troops in harm's way, further undercut US forces' morale, and risk further
alienation of elements of the Iraqi populace. American casualties would
probably rise, at least temporarily, as more troops are on the streets; we saw
this when the brigade from Alaska was extended
and sent into Baghdad
last summer. And even if the increased troop presence initially intimidates or
frustrates the contending militias, it won't be long before they find ways to
work around the obstacles to movement and neighbourhood searches, if they are
still intent on pursuing the conflict. All of this is not much of an
endorsement for a troop surge that will impose real pain on the already
overstretched US
forces.
There could be other uses for troops, for example,
accelerating training for the Iraqi military and police. But even here, vetting
these forces for their loyalty has proven problematic. Therefore, neither
accelerated training nor more troops in the security mission can be viewed
mechanistically, as though a 50 per cent increase in effort will yield a 50 per
cent increased return, for other factors are at work.
The truth is that, however brutal the fighting in Iraq for our
troops, the underlying problems are political. Vicious ethnic cleansing is
under way right under the noses of our troops, as various factions fight for
power and survival. In this environment security is unlikely to come from
smothering the struggle with a blanket of forces - it cannot be smothered
easily, for additional US
efforts can stir additional resistance - but rather from more effective action
to resolve the struggle at the political level. And the real danger of the
troop surge is that it undercuts the urgency for the political effort. A new US ambassador might help, but, more
fundamentally, the US
and its allies need to proceed from a different approach within the region. The
neocons' vision has failed.
Well before the 2003 invasion, the administration was
sending signals that its intentions weren't limited to Iraq; Syria
and Iran
were mentioned as the next targets. Small wonder then that Syria and Iran
have worked continuously to meddle in Iraq. They had reason to believe
that if US action succeeded
against Iraq,
they would soon be targets themselves. Dealing with meddling neighbours is an
essential element of resolving the conflict in Iraq. But this requires more than
border posts, patrols and threatening statements. Iran has thus far come out
the big winner in all of this, dispensing with long-time enemy Saddam, gaining
increased influence in Iraq, pursuing nuclear capabilities and striving to
enlarge further its reach. The administration needs a new strategy for the
region now, urgently, before Iran can gain nuclear capabilities.
America should take the lead with direct diplomacy to
resolve the interrelated problems of Iran's push for regional hegemony, Lebanon
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Isolating adversaries hasn't worked. The
region must gain a new vision, and that must be led diplomatically by the most
powerful force in the region, the United States.
Without such fundamental change in Washington's approach,
there is little hope that the troops surge, Iraqi promises and accompanying
rhetoric will amount to anything other than "stay the course more".
That wastes lives and time, perpetuates the appeal of the terrorists, and
simply brings us closer to the showdown with Iran. And that will be a tragedy
for not just Iraq but our friends in the region as well.
Retired General Wesley Clark, former Supreme
Commander of Nato, is a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International
Relations
Source: Comment.independent
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